Barry Smith Introduction to Adolf Reinach On the Theory of the Negative Judgment Adolf Reinach was born in Mainz on the 23rd December 1883. Between 190 I and 1905 he studied philosophy, psychology and jurisprudence in Munich , and his disse rtation on the psychological foundations of jurisprudence, Ubet den Ursllchenbegriff im ge/lenden Strafrecht, I hears traces of the psychologistic approach of his teache r, Theodor Lipps. Lipps' psychologism came under heavy criticism in Husscrl's Logical Investigations. published in 1900/ 0 I, a work which enjoyed an almost immediate success in Munich .2 A circle of philosophe rs was established, to which among others Reinach, Pftindc r, Daubert, TheoJ or Conrad and August Gallinger belonged , the members of which adopted the Logicallnve.'lligaliolls as their philosophical canon, awarding special significance to Husserl's account of material a priori re lations among esse nces or kinds. Between 1905 and 1909 Reinach spent lo ng periods studying under Husserl in Gottingen, preparing in 1909 a Habilitationsschrift (Wesen lind Systernaric des Urteils) on the theory of judgment;l many of whose ideas are summarised in the essay which follows. Reinach remained in G6ttingen as a Privatdozent until 1914 when he was called to (he front. He fe ll in Flanders on the 16th November 1917 4 Here we shall discuss the most importan t works from Reinach"s Gbttingen pe riod on the material a priori, o n the (heory of judgment, and on the a priori structures of socia l acts. § I Kant and Hume on the Material A priori Reinach's paper, " Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems" , of 191 I embodies an attempted clarification of the concept of the synthetic II priori which was acknowledged by Husserl as having played a sig289 from Barry Smith (ed.), Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982, 289–313 nificant role in the development of his pure (a priori) phenomenology." The paper hegiñ hy challenging the adequacy of Kant's understanding of the Humean concept of relations of ideas. 'Relations of ideas, in contradistinction ot matters of face depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together ... 'Tis from the idea of a triangle that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles lwar to two right ones: and this relation j" invariahle. as long as our idea remains the same (Trealist', 13k I, Pt.III, ~ I). Kant wishes to identify propositions expressing relations of ideas with judgments whose truth is, in his terms, 'grounded in concepts', i.e. with analytic judgments. This identification finds initial support in the fact that, in the Enquiry at least (sec Sect. IV, Part I), it is the truths of algehra, geometry and arithmetic which are put forward in illustration of the concept of relation of ideas. In the Treatise how~ver, a numher of other relations of ideas are mentioned,6 for which the assumption of analyticity is, as Reinach argues, wholly implausihle. Consider, for example, the proposition 'red and orange arc similar'. It would clearly he nonsensical to suppose that the conceph)f resemhlance is 'contained' in the concepts of red and orange . Yet Hume ascrihes precisely the same hasic determinations h) the relatiun of resemblance and the other remaining relations of ideas as he docs tt) the mathematical relations of ideas. Further, not only did he never directly characterise mathematical propositions as analytic: such a view would, when considered against the hackground of his other views, lead to the greatest absurdities. ~ How, then, are we to understand relations of ideas, if not as analytic connections amongst (Kantian) concepts? A preliminary answer to this question is provided by a comparison with Locke, who is much closer to Hume at this point than is Kant. Loeke separates knowledge that is genuinely instructive from analytic or 'trifling' knowledge. He explicitly contrasts the proposition 'The external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles' with empty propositions such as 'what is a soul is a soul' (Essay, IV, 8). 290 To be sure, th is mathematica l proposition says something about a ' complex idea ', flOI however something which is 'contained in it ', but ra ther something which is ' a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea' ,s Where Locke 's identical propositions 'only affi rm the same term of themselves', instructive propositions 'find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question.' We shall return shortly to the question of how relations of ideas are to be unde rstood in the framework of Humean (or Lockean) philosophy as this is viewed by Reinach, First however it is necessary to consider briefly the problem of causality ('das Humcsche Problem' referred to in the title of Reinach's paper). Consider the two judgments: 'event a follows upon eve nt b' and 'a is connected with b by a re lation of causal necessi ty'. What should be noted is th at the second judgment materially enriches the content of the first : In both cases, a relation between a and b is being asserted in the first case o nly a re lation of temporal sequence, in the second case one of necessary connection, The second relation, in a certa in manner, includes the first within itse lf. hut it goes far beyond the first with respect to its content. Therefore, whether I make the fi rst o r the second judgment signifies a fundamental difference in material content. It is quite otherwise however in the case of a judgment such as '2 X 2 = 4'. Here I assert a relation between 2 x 2 and 4 ; but if I judge that 2 x 2 is necessarily 4, ev idently I do not assert any new relation between the arithmetical terms ( Reinach, op. cil .. p. 181 f.). In order to draw attention to the fact that , in the latter case, it is the state of affai rs as a whole that is characterised in a specific way, Re inach designates the necessi ty involved as m odal necessity, Where mathematical propositions exhibit only this modal necessity. causal propositions lay claim also to a certain kind of material necessity, that is to a necessa ry connection among the parts of the corresponding states of affa irs. Fire produces heat, i.e, is, in its very nature, causally or necessarily connected wi th heat. In Kant's view a view which accords well wi th his narrow interpretation of re lations of ideas as analytic connections amongst concepts 29 1 Hume's inquiries were directed exclusively towards modal necessity, the necessity which causal propositions share with mathematical and logical propositions. Reinach, on the other hand, wants to defend the view that Hume's attention was mainly though sometimes confusedly directed towards macerial necessity: What Hume wants to inquire into is 'necessary connection', and this is regarded by him as a relational predicate about which the question arises , to begin with , whether it is determined by the nature of its terms exactly as similarity is determined by the essence of two colours. Such a consideration makes sense only in the case of what we have called material necessity ... Kant repeatedly emphasises, with full justification, that necessity can never be given through experience. As contrasted with this, Hume tries to find it in experience. The reason for this lies in the fact that one of them is thinking of modal necessity, the other of material necessity (op. cit., p. 184f.) Hume's conclusion, of course, was that he was unable to discern in experience any evidence of necessary (material) connection between events. The inadequacy of this conclusion should not however blind us as it did Kant to the fine structure of Hume's presuppositions: According to Kant, Hume saw only two possibilities: either the foundation of the causal judgment in pure reason, or the explanation of it from experience, i.e. from the mechanism of association and the 'subjective necessity arising from it ', which is falsely taken to to be objective. That for Hume there is a third possibility the immediate grounding of necessity through experience is overlooked by Kant and, from Kant's standpoint, must be overlooked. (op. cit. , p. 186). Hume could contemplate the possibility of grounding material necessity through experience only because for him, as for Reinach and Husserl, this necessity has both an epistemological and an ontological side, only because, that is to say, relations of ideas are also relations of things.9 Indeed, the most important conclusion to be drawn from Reinach's essay is that the treatment of the syntbetic a priori had been set on the wrong road by the one-sidedly epistemological approach initiated by Kant.l0 Relations of ideas are, in Reinach's vocabulary, essential structures, "structures wherein a predicate is 'conditioned by', or is grounded in, the nature of the terms that are placed in relation to one another" (op. cit., p. 166)." 292 It is grounded in the nature of the numbers 3 and 2 that the former is greater than the latter; but there are no material things whose nature it is to lie beside each other. With exactly identical properties, things may be either near each other or far removed from each other. In the one case, therefore, the predicate is grounded in the essence of the subjects; in the other case, not so (op. cit., p. 164). We shall see in what follows that, even amongst the things, events, and processes of the material world, a wealth of essential a priori connections is capable of being disclosed. § 2 The Philosophy of Sachyerhalte The concept of Sachverhalt or state of affairs plays a central role in Reinach's philosophy to a degree equalled, perhaps, only in Wittgenstein's Tracfatus. 12 In the 18th and 19th centuries, logieal orthodoxy in both Germany and England had rested on a conception of the judgment as a compound of concepts or presentations. Judgments thus conceived have no direct ontological correlates of their own: they are true or false in virtue of the existence or non-existence of a corresponding combination amongst the ontological correlates of their constituent concepts. Against this background, the recognition of the heterogeneity of the judgment as compared to (atomic or molecular) concepts or presentations and in particular the isolation of the moment of assertive force by Brentano and Frege 13 was a considerable step forward. Yet the equally important step of recognising also a heterogeneous category of jugdment-correlates, a category of entities in the world which would make judgments or sentences true or false, was taken neither by Frege nor by Brcntano. 14 The delineation of this category was first carried through effectively by Husserl in the LogiclIllnvesligatioflS, 15 receiving its most refined form in the essay by Reinach which follows. The distinction between propositions or meaning-correlates of judgements, and states of affairs or object-correlates of judgments, has since been taken for granted not only by continental philosophers influenced by Husserl, but also in much analytic philosophical work on logical semantics and on the ontology of facts. Within Austrian philosophy however, particularly in the work of Bolzano. and of philosophers in the Brentano school such as Meinong 293 and Marty, this distinction was not made. 16 Bolzano's Satze an sich and Meinong's Objektive exhibit traits characteristic of both meaning-entities and object-entities,17 and it is difficult to see how these two sets of traits can be reconciled. Objektive, for example, are compared to ideal meanings in possessing an eternal or timeless existence, yet they are also viewed as being capable of containing real material objects as constituents. 18 The same ontological brinkmanship is manifest in work of Moore and Russell on the proposition,'9 and it can be discerned also in the work of Chisholm (another philosopher heavily influenced by both Meinong and Brentano), particularly in his conception of a generalised category of states of affairs which would include as sub-categories both events and propositions.2o For Husserl, as for Reinach, the meaning-object dichotomy is firstly a distinction between the sense and quality of an act on the one hand, and the object intended in the act on the other: thus every act of judgment, for example, exhibits both a meaning and (at least if the judgment is true) an associated state of affairs. But it is secondly a distinction between the two separate disciplines of formal logic and formal ontology." A further dichotomy arises when we consider states of affairs from the point of view of existential ontology and ask after the mode of existence of statal entities.22 Is the existence of states of affairs dependent upon that of more or less distantly associated mental or linguistic acts? Or do they enjoy an autonomous existence, independently of mind or language? In Husserlian terms, is the state of affairs this rose is red a moment residing exclusively in the ontological orbit of the rose, or is it rather a moment of a larger whole constituted by, inter alia, a corresponding act of judgment. A variant of the first position is defended by Reinach in the essay below. The second position has been defended by, for example, Meinong and Strawson (compare the latter's claim that 'U you prise the statements off the world you prise the facts off it too'23). The most extreme affirmative position concerning the autonomy of statal entities is one which asserts that there is such an entity corresponding to every possible judgment, to every possible wellformed sentence, whether true or false . This position is characteristic of ontological rationalism or platonism as evinced, in different ways, by Bolzano, Frege, Meinong and Chisholm.24 A view of this kind is defensible, I believe, only where it relates to entities belonging to the sphere of meaning (to Frege's 'realm of sense') or, as in Meinong's case, to some hy294 lInd sphere of quasi-meanings. Where states of affairs are conceived as ! lhlect-entities. tied down to the real world of Frege's 'ordinary refer- ('!Its', then it becomes impossible to develop intuitions which could \tlpport such all-embracing platonism: what mind-independent exterIlal referent. what constituent part or contour of the world, could corIl'spond, for example, to a false sentence, to a counterfactual conditioIlal, or to a judgment concerning the indefinite future? Clearly some restriction is needed upon sentences to which autonomous Sachverhalre may he expected to be correlated. The most obvious restriction consists in denying objectual correlates to judgments that .Ife false. An alternative, however, is to distinguish amongst the totality nl autonomously existing states of affairs, subsistent states of affairs ~'orresponding to true judgments, and non-subsistent states of affairs l'orresponding to those that arc false. This is the position adopted by Meinong, by Reillach. and by Wittgenstein in the Tractalus.:: s Philosophers who adopt this latter approach may be inclined also to l'onceive statal entities as possessing an eternal existence, as custodians ()f (eternal) truth and falsity in a world of transient objects.::h Wittgenstein, as is well known, adopted the opposite view, regarding objects as what is unalterable and subsistent. their configuration in states of affairs .IS what is changing and unstable (Traclalus, 2.027), a position which echoes the ontological atomism of Hcrbart. . The most serious controversy in the formal ontology of states of affairs however has concerned the relative status of positive and negative states of affairs. For Wittgenstein, as, for example, for Pfiinder (Logik, Section I), all states of affairs arc positive: Reinach however was insistent that there arc both positive and negative states of affairs and that, whilst these have distinct epistemological properties, they are, in regard to their mode of being, indistinguishable. Reinach's views on negative states of affairs were criticised by Ingarden in his Der Sln'i[ um die Eristellz. der Well. Ingarden argued that if states of affairs are to be conceived as object-entities. dovetailed with the individual objects, events, properties and relations in the real world, then it is clearly justifiable to say of a state of affairs such as this rose is red that it exists autonomously, since here all of the constituents of the state, i.e. the rose and its individual accident of redness, themselves exist autonomously. Consider however the negative state of affairs [his rose is /lot blue. Here whilst the rose itself exists autonomously, the property involved is only thought or intended; it is carried into the si295 tuation from outside by our act of judgment. Therefore, argues Ingarden, the mode of existence of such a state of affairs must be distinct from that of the positive, autonomous state of affairs. 27 Hence we have distinguished, at this level of generality, three alternative positions regarding the autonomy of states of affairs: Ingarden's position, according to which only states of affairs corresponding to positive, true sentences exist autonomously;28 Wittgenstein's position, according to which both subsistent and non-subsistent Sachverhalte exist, but all are positive; and Reinach's position which allows both positive and negative, subsistent and non-subsistent Sachverhalte. 29 In the present essay Reinach considers in detail only those properties of Sachverhalle that are of relevance to the theory of jUdgment, and specifically to the theory of the negative judgment. 30 The clarity of Reinach's own exposition makes superfluous the duplication of his arguments here. It is however worth pointing out that, in contrast to most modern philosophical logicians, he is concerned not merely with logical (deductive) and semantic properties and relations amongst judgments (or propositions) considered in abstraction from their contexts of use, but also with the judgment as a mental act, bound up with other mental acts of recognising, thinking, arguing and inferring. 31 His account rests on a distinction between two types of mental formation: spontaneous, temporally punctual and typically linguistically articulated acts, on the one hand, and non-spontaneous, enduring conditions or states typically only loosely associated with language, on the other. To the first category belong (episodic) acts of assertion, denial, questioning, etc., acts of perceptual or cognitive apprehension and of evaluation of objects or states of affairs, acts of intending an object (e.g. of meaning so-and-so by the use of a given proper name), acts of promising, commanding, forgiving, requesting, etc. To the second category belong states of conviction or belief, of having something (some object or state of affairs) before or on one's mind, of enjoying some sensation, of feeling obliged or committed to someone, etc. 32 Reinach's principal charge against previous accounts of the judgment was that the distinction between judgment as assertion and judgment as conviction had been ignored, or, more generally, that the relation between the two spheres had been thoroughly misunderstood, whether in accounts of the dependence of judgment as assertion upon an underlying conviction or belief, or of the dependence of, say, an act of promising upon an underlying intention or volition. (Reinach's application of these ideas to 296 the sphere of legal or quasi-legal formations such as acts of promising will be considered briefl y in the section which follows.} A nore on illfluellces: In considering the influence of 'O n the Theory of the Negative Judgment' it would almost certainly be wrong to assume any awareness of Reinach's work on the part of the author of the Tractow s. despite the similarities between the respective Sachverhair-ontologies of Wittgenstein on the one hand, and of Reinach and the other Munich phenomenologists on the o ther. JJ These similarities are almost certainly to be attributed to a shared influence upon both Reinach and Wittgenstein of the work of Meinong, and pe rhaps also of Stumpf and Husser!''' Where Reinach did exert a substantial influence was upon the members of the MunichGottingen circle of phenomenologists themselves, and in pa rticular upon Ingarden, whose 1925 analysis of the category problem 35 owes much to the Reinachian approach to states of affairs. Reinach exerted an importance influence also upon Otto Selz, a Wtirzburg psychologist who applied Husserlian and Reinachian ideas in his work on the psychology of thinking." Conside ration of these and other influences will however have to be postponed for another place. § 3 The Theory of Social Acts The fundamental principle of Reinach's philosophy may be expressed as follows: for every domain of objects, whether psychological or materi al, math ematical or grammatical , a detcrminate ly structured family of essences can be discovered, standing in a priori re lations to each other, as a re flection of which corresponding a priori laws ho ld of the objects in question. These laws are certain and unchangeable; they are prior to any human convention and would obtain even though never actually recognised by any thinking subject.37 A system of material essences can be disclosed, for example, for the domain of human emotions, fOT human value-phenomena, including th e phenomena of cthics,38 and as in Reinach's own essay below, for the sphere of judgment and of cognitive phe nomena in general. Reinach's own most original contribution to philosophy lay in the application of this principle to legal and quasi-legal formations as these occu r in human societies, and in particular to acts of promising, apolo297 gising, forgiving, requesting, commanding, and so on, and to the social phenomena associated with these. The peculiar characteristics of acts of this kind were re-discovered ~everal decades after Reinach's work by Anglo-Saxon speech act theorists. 39 Relllach's work on social acts IS presented in his "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des btirgerlichen Rechts" (The A priori Foundations of the Civil La\v), first puhlished in volume I of Husserl's .!ahrhuch in 1 Y 13. Consider, first of all, the social formations of claim and obligation. Many philosophers before Reinach's day had been tempted to regard these formations as reducible in some way to the mental experiences, or to the beliefs or dispOSitions of the subJects involved. All such theories however, as Relllach argues. 4 () completely by-pass that which is essential to these formations. For whilst there is, certainly, such a thing as a . ~ belief in the existence uf a claim or of an ohligation, this is something which, as a matter of principle, can be identically constituted whether or not the purported claim or obligation really exists, and even IIldependently of whcthcr it belongs to the subject in questIOn or to some alien subject. Further it is clear that claims and obligations can exi,t in the absence of ally knowledgc or beliefs of this kind. as they can eXist also in the absence of any feelings of entitlcment. 41 Claims and ohligations arc like mental entities, however. in the sense that they always and of necessity require a bearer (typically an individual person): they can, like mental experiences. be regarded as individual moments of their hearers. In addition we can see that claims and obligations of necessity require a determinate content: every obligation has as its content some future conduct (Vcrhaltcn, that is action or forbearance) on the part of it bearer, and thi" content is shared by the claim or claims with which the obligation is interwoven. A claim or obligation also has a specific temporal structure: no claim or obligation comes into existence without some specific ground or reason for this existence. In the terminology of Husserrs third Logical Investigatiun, then, they arc founded upon (require of necessity to exist in a more inclusive whole with) events of specific types, for example acts of prom ising.42 It is a synthetica priori truth that an act of promising immediately and of necessity hrings about a mutually correlated claim and obligation. The commonly held view of the act of promising had been that it is simply the expression of an act of will or of an intention to act in the interests of the party before whom the declaration is made. The most ob298 \ ious inadequacy of this account is that it throws no light on the probkll1 of how :-.uch an utterance should bring ahout a claim and obligation "I the appropriate kind. It is after all dear, that the bare intention to do ,( lmething has no quasi legal consequences of the given sort, and it is difficult to sec how any essential difference is made hy the simple expression of such an intention. In the wake of Austin and Searle the fundamental categorial distinction between promi:-.ing and communicating one's inkntion to do somei iling is readily accepted. Reinach :-.ought, in his It) \3, to provide a l\ Hnplete and systematic theory of all sllch phenomena. Both types of .Ict, he points out, involve deliherate linguistic utterance. They fall withIII the (wider) class of what Reinach calls spontaneous acts, i.e. acts which consi:-.t in a subject's hringing something about within his own psychic sphere, a:-. contrasted with passivc experiences of. say. feeling a Ilain or hearing a nOIse .+'; Not all spontaneous acts arc linguistic in chardcter (clI1sideL for example, <1 deliherate turning of the attention toward sOlllelhing). Further. there are certain types of spontaneous act which Illay involve all overt linguistic lItter~lnce but 1'01' which this moment or nVL'rtncss is non-essential: for example, (lcts of judgment (one Illay P(ls-.. judgmellt without giving lilly outward sign of having done so), or al',>o acts of forgiving, praising, cursing, blaming, praying, and so on. In ~ach case (Ill overt linguistic utterance is a possible but not a necessary. constituent of the (lct in question. Ollecln already dearly sec. however. that for certaill other types of spontaneous act this dispensability (~f ;1 linguistic utterance does not apply. The utterance of a command. for cxample, or of a promise or yllcstion, is clearly a necessar~: or essential c()mponellt of the total act. Rein:lCh dccordingly divides spont<II1COllS ;lcts into t\\O classes. which he calls lll/cnllll <lnd I'\"/('nwl, according to whether the act's heing divulged. being brought to overt expression, is a dispensable or separable piece. or ;tn indispcns~lhle, inseparahle moment of the act-complex in lJ ues tin 11.--l--l A further division, olle which applIes not merely to spontaneous acts but to mental phenolllcna gelleLtlly, is that hdWCCnlll)ll-scl/-dirccwh!c dets, i.e. acts which demand of ncce:-;sity an alien subject toward whom they arc directed (whether internally or externally), and acts such as lo\-e and hate 'Which may he directed toward one's self.--l" Again, an act of commanding clearly presupposes essentially the existence of one or mnrc alien subjects 10 whom the command may hI.' addressed: such an act, if it is to exist at all, demands not merely that -like all mental phenomena it have a bearer, but also that one or more additional subjects should exist toward whom it is directed. It is necessary I in other words, that the bearer of the act should exist as part of a more inclusive whole whose constituents are connected together in some specific way (in this case through the enduring relationship between commander and commanded which consists in the fact that the former has authority over the latter). A further peculiarity is possessed by certain specific types of external, non-self-directable acts, that they are such that their constituent utterance must of necessity be grasped by the subject(s) toward whom the act is directed: the issuer of a command must not merely utter the command in public; he must direct this utterance to its addressees in such a way that it is received and understood by them in an appropriate way. This peculiarity of commands, that they stand in need of being directed to and per<:eived by their addressees, is absent, for example, from acts offorgiveness. Reinach introduces the term social acl to designate those spontaneous acts which stand in need of being addressed to and of becoming correlately perceived by their addressees. A social act is an action of the subject to which is essential not only its spontaneity and its intentionality. but also its being directed towards alien subjects and its standing in need of being perceived by those subjects. What has been said of commands holds also for requests, admonitions, questionings, informings, answerings, and many other types of act. They are all social acts which are, in their execution, cast toward an alien subject that they may take hold of or bring about effects inside him (einern anderen l.ugeworfen urn sich in seine Seele einl.uhacken) .46 It is, Reinach argues, essential to the social act that it be a single, integral whole articulated both internally and externally: that it should exhibit both internal (psychological) moments and external (physical) moments (in being, typically, an overt linguistic utterance) . Inner experiences of many kinds shame, or love, or anger may equally be brought to overt expression; but here the outward-facing moment is to some degree an arbitrary and dispensable supplement in the total act. In the case of social acts proper, in contrast, it is not as though we have, in the act, two independent parts, more or less intimately associated with each other: the act, in being executed, constitutes itself as an inextricable whole within which the internal and external moments exhibit a 300 manifold of interdependencies and can be distinguished from each other only abstractly. This peculiarity of social acts is clearl y expressed by Reinach in his critique of Hume's account of the act of promising. Hume, as is well known, seeks to discover a type of mental act which might accompany the utterance of a promise and thereby lend it its peculiar status as a promise. But the attitude in which this search is carried out is mistaken from the start. Hume wishc!o. to di scover an experience which hecomes expressed in a promise. which therefore could he prescnt without the presence of any accompanying expression. And o f course he cannot succeed in exhibiting such an inne r experi ence. He rejects quite prope rl y the experiences of resolving, wbhing. willing; but what he docs not sec a t a ll . is that besides such inne r experience there exist also <Icti vit ies of the mind which do not merely find in words their acc ide ntal, supplement a l expression. bu t which come to execu tion in the act of speaking itsel f and of which it is characte ris ti c that they an no unce themselves to ano the r by means of this or some simila r ex te rna l appearance:" So. too. it is easy to see that there is no independent and self-contained mental ex perience which is somehow brought to expression in the issue of a com mand. The re could not even in principle be such an experience. Yet it is nevertheless true that social acts of necessity presuppose or are founded upon appropriate conditions of mind on the part of their bearers. The act of imparting presupposes a conviction of the content which is imparted. An act o f questioning essentia ll y excludes such a convictio n. requiring instead a state o f uncertainty in relation to its content. The psychologica l presupposition of a request is the wish that that which is reques ted sho uld happen or. more specifiGl ll y. that it should be brought about hy he to whom the req uest has been addressed . A com mand has for its foundation not merely the desire . but the volition. tha t the addressee should ca rry out that which has been commanded.'U! All of this is of course to assume that one distinguishes a request as such fro m a sham (me rely apparent) request , a question as such from a conversa tio nal ploy. etc. Indeed every social act is of necessity subject to a system of essential modifications of these and uther specific types, subject to secondary a priori laws of their own. Thus when a speaker executes an act with the intention of prese nting it as a social act of a given type bu t from which the necessary underlying foundation is mlssmg. 30 1 then of course we do not have a mere string of words: lies and dissimulations, too, are social acts of determinate types. 49 We might summarise the above hy means of the following examples: The illlcrnal and external tnOlncnts of the social act of imparting or informing: I can he convinced of (believe in) a particular state of affairs without ever giving expression to this conviction in an assertion, or only in an assertion which I keep to myself. For an imparting of the state of affairs to be effected it is essential not only that an assertion he made, but also that this assertion be specifically addressed to a second suhject who is in a position to perceive and understand it. Here, as in all subsequent cases, the social act in question can he considered as an ahstract moment of a whole consisting of two (or more) suhjects reticulated together in a specific way. The present example involves the simplest possihle whole of this kind, consisting merely of two suhjects connected together momentarily hy a single, tketing cartilaginous hand, namely the particular utterance itself. In suhsequent cases the encompassing wholes with which we have to deal will exhihit more complicated structures. Consider, for example, the encompassing whole which must exist if a social act of joining together in holy matrimony is to be effected. The internal and external moments of the social {leiS of requesting and commanding: These two acts may share an identical content and exhihit identical physical appearance (differing, perhaps, only in their emphasis or tone of voice). They differ most importantly in the presence in or underlying the latter of a prior enduring relationship of SUbjugation, a legal formation of a quite specific kind, different from any merely psychological dispositions whieh may equally encompany an act of requestmg. An important difference between these acts and acts of imparting is that where, in the latter, the addressee's becoming aware of the content of the act is of itself sufficient to bring to fulfilment the project which is announced in the act (or, as we might also say: to saturate the whole which is initially projected by it), this leads only to a provisional staging-post in the case of acts of requesting or commanding. Here it is only the subsequent realisation of the request or command in appropriate 302 conduct of the addressee that can truly close the circle which has been npened with the execution of the initial act. The internal alld external rtloments of the social aCfs of questioning lind answering: Questioning, too, is a type of social act which somehow demands or calls forth a specific response on the part of the addressee, namely, a further social act of answering. The latter docs not demand in its turn any subsequent action on the part of he to whom it is addressed, hut rather presupposes some prior action, and indeed presupposes always and essentially a social act of a determinate type. Thus we can distinguish, following Rcinach. social acts of, e.g. answering or ratifying, which presupposi.? other, prior social acts; and social acts of requesting, questioning. commanding, promising, etc., which aim towards subsequent social acts or toward activities of other kinds. And we can see that the relationships holding amongst social acts and among the act-complexes into which thcy enter as essential constituents may exhibit certain specific kinds of temporal determinations. It is not, howeva, as though a social act of, say, promising, can necessitate the future realisation of appropriate conduct: it can at most establish what has been called an a priori kndency, so a necessitation of a type which is conditional upon the absence of supervening considerations (e.g. of a moral nature, or relating to physical impracticability).:'i I As a result of the episodic tie he tween hearer and receiver which is the act of promising, these two individuals hecome affected, as regards their subsequent conduct in relation to each other (their sielt Zlieillllnder Verhalten), in virtue of the fact that the relation hetween them is not a saturated relation (hliriedigte Bezieltuflg), resting complete in itself.:'i2 It is such as to call forth a specific type of action on the part of the bearer of the ohligation brought into being hy the act, namely the realisation of the relevant content. An obligation therefore carries in itself the determination to hring itself to an end, and a tendency also towards the dropping apart, as it were. of the two individuals who have hecome related to each other through obligation. § 4 On the Nexus of Representation It would be impossible for us to go into detail here concerning the whole range of issues discussed by Reinach in "The A priori Founda303 tions of the Civil Law". In particular we cannot consider Reinach's discussions of legal rights and of the origins of legal rights, claims and obligations, nor his discussion of coUective and divided ownership, of contract theory, and of those particularly important kinds of speech acts which, when executed by jurists, result in the establishment of new law. We cannot consider either the various possible modifications of social acts of which the modification of the act of imparting information in an act of lying is just one amongst a whole range of examples. We shall however discuss one particularly important species of such modification, since this may serve to clarify further aspects of Reinach's theory of social acts and of the relations of this theory to his general philosophical methodology. It is a commonplace that acts of, say, thanking, blessing, commanding, promising, accepting (delivery of something), perhaps also acts of murder and the like, may, under appropriate conditions, be carried out by one individual in the name of another" The determination of which acts are, of their nature, subject to this proxy-modification is one task of the a priori theory of social acts and of related formations. The execution of an act in the name of another is of necessity quite a different thing from its being carried out 'in his spirit', that is, in such a way as to conform to his presumed or expressed intentions. I can act in the spirit of another without acting in his name, and I can act in his name without acting in his spirit. Indeed it is not any kind of knowledge of the intentions of the represented party which forms the inner state or mental condition on the basis of which the acts of the representative are executed, but rather the intention that the consequences which ensue from this execution should fall not to him, but to the person in whose name he acts. Thus, when I execute a promise on another person's behalf, no obligations are acquired by me thereby, but rather in appropriate circumstances by this other person. As Reinach points out, this possibility that the rights and obligations of a person may be transformed or brought to an end, or that he may acquire new rights without being himself aware of it seems at first quite extraordinary." Clearly however I cannot execute, say, promises in the name of another purely at random; not even the will of this other to acquire specific obligations suffices to make my promises in his name effective. Some relevant conduct on his part is presupposed. One might initially suppose that the execution by him of a prior act of promising would be what was required. But the consequences of a promise are in no way identical with 304 those of a genuine relationship of representation. For if the principal promises his representative that he will do that which is promised in his name, then the obligation which he acquires is an obligation which arises not from any promise which is subsequently executed by proxy, but from his own promise. And moreover it is then not the relevant third party to whom he is obliged as it would be in the case of the obligations flowing out of an effective relationship of representation, but the representative himself. And if instead he should promise this third party that he will indeed effect that which his representative might subsequently promise in his name, then whilst there arises here an obligation of the required content and in relation to the appropriate person, it is one which flows directly out of this initial promise: the subsequent act of the representative serves merely to make known, in regard to this particular obligation, what its particular content is. The obligation is not at all onc which springs from the promising act which becomes executed on the principal's behalf, as it would be in the case of a genuine nexus of representation. Nor, either, is the representation relation rooted in social acts of commanding. The representative is not, for example. a mere messenger of the represented party. Even should a representative be charged. in the fullest detail, with executing only a single act of promising in the name of someone else, he remains therein a representative; he retains at least the authority to execute just this act. The messenger, in contrast , is not the executor of any legal-social act at all: the social act of imparting information which he does perform stands, rather, in the service of the legal-social act which is executed through it by another. How, then, does the nexus of representation become established? We have seen that persons are able, by executing acts of promising, to acquire obligations for themselves. How can they come to have the authority. to generate obligations for others? Clearly this is something which can be granted only by the person who will in fact acquire the obligations in question. The act of granting such authority is not however an act of transfer (comparable, e.g. to a transfer of property) , for the authority remains at the same time and will continue to remain in its original hands. It is , rather, as if this authority is something sui generis which can be re-generated, re-created anew in the person of another. The act of granting such authority by the principal to his agent will of course typically be supplemented by further information-giving social 305 acts expressing the will of the principal as to how his representative should proceed on his bchalf in given circumstances. But such acts are not essential constituents of the act of granting authority itself (they can be wholly absent without the latter thereby suffering the least effect). This essential separateness of granting authority and conveying information is further revealed in the fact that should the representative subsequently act in the name of but against the stated intentions of his principal, this can in no way be taken to have damaged his status as a representative. and he will suffer retributive consequences only to the extent that he had himself entered from the start into an IIddiliol1al obligation to abide by such intentions. In Husserlian terms we can say that a representative h. in his capacity as a representative of ll. and a himself, qua represented party. arc mutually founding, interdependent moments. As a result of a's having granted to h an appropriate authority the two individuals are mutually adjusted to each other and remain so adjusted as long as this authority does not expire or become rescinded in a new social act on the part of a. During this interval a and h need have no further dealings with each other: their mutual adjustment is as it were relatively isolated from the consequences of their respective behaviouL In the course of his operations h will typically execute a variety of social acts in the name of his principal. Fixing on one such act, say a proxy act of promising in which h becomes momentarily tied to another party c, we can see that as a consequence of this momentary tie II automatically becomes enduringly reticulated with (' -even though the two parties may in fact have had no direct dealings with each other, since the obligations to c arising from the promise accrue to ll. Hence here. as in other cases. there arc two levels of interconnection between the various constituents of the founded wholes before us. a and h, first of aiL must have become mutually adjusted to each other in an cnduring nexus of representation. Only thereby can b (in his capacity, etc.) proceed to erect a temporally punctual link between himself and c which will have among its automatic consequences the immediate establishment of a second temporally extended mutual adjustment between a and c. Proper names, too, according to a familiar theory. arc said to go proxy for their objects (see e.g. Tractatus, 4.0312); and whilst Rcinach himself did not discuss this matter. it may be of some interest to round off this introduction to his essay with a brief consideration of the proxy theory of names in the light of the Reinachian theory of social acts.55 It 306 wilJ help us to gain some initial insight into the name-object nexus if we pause to consider that species of social act of most immediate relevance to the theory of proper names, the act of legal baptism. The possibility of baptism demands, first of all, that a corresponding authority be vested in some individual in virtue of which appropriately constituted acts of this individual have as their a priori consequences certain legal effects. We might be tempted to suppose that his acts have the nature of commands, in establishing certain obligations on the part of the members of the relevant community to act in certain ways. This could imply at most however that the community is obliged to behave as if 'Gottlob', say, were Gottlob's name, which could suffice only to establish a certain regularity of association of 'Gottlob' with Gottlob: the fact that this is his name would remain thereby untouched. Rather, we must recognise that the baptismal authority is empowered to generate new legal formations of a quite peculiar, hitherto unrecognised kind, namely names. It is by now well-understood that an act of promising has, as a matter of a priori necessity, the immediate effect of bringing into being the mutually correlated legal formations of claim and obligation . So, here, the act of baptism has as its immediate effect the bringing into being of the legal formation which is the baptismal name . The peculiarity of baptismal legal formations is that they are also units of language and belong, in this capacity, to the subject-matter of the various linguistic disciplines of phonology, etc. But what is the nature of such formations qua objects of the a priori theory of law? Once again it is foundation relations which we have before us. 'Gottlob' qua name-of-this-particular-individual depends for its existence upon the existence of this individual; as a knighthood, for example, or an individual knowledge of Greek, is necessarily dependent upon the existence of its bearer. Gottlob's name is, then, a moment founded upon the whole which is (the baptised) Gottlob and this will help us to explain how 'Gottlob' qua name of this particular individual can differ from 'Gottlob' qua name of that particular individual. What is before us here is not any arbitrary convention to treat one and the same linguistic unit as if it were the name of two separate individuals, but rather legal formations which are already two dIfferent objec/s, as my knighthood or headache is already, in virtue of being mine, a different object from your knighthood or headache . We can now see the sense in the analogy between legal representation and the naming relationship: the proper name (qua name) can 307 serve as an adequate proxy for its bearer (qua named object) in virtue of being founded upon the latter in the Husserlian sense. Just as, no matter what georgraphieal distance may separate a representative from his principal, the two remain inextricably bound together, so too a proper name, even when at work in contexts which are far flung in relation to its bearer, functions in its jurisdiction as that ohject's name. A range of further applications of the methodology of foundation relations, not to proper names, but to sentences and to sentence-using acts, will be found in the essay which follows. Notes I Leipzig: Barth, I tJ05. 'It is reported amongst the earliest of Husserl's students that in the Summer of Il)02 that is hetween one and two years after the appearance of the l.ogicalltll'('stiglltiofls a student rode hy hicycle from Braunschweig to Cli)ttingen where, thick with dust. he entered the Husserl house. The two of them argued for hours ahout the Logical 1111 'Cstigaliofls until Husserl rose excitedly, called his wife into the room, and said, "lIere is someone who has read and undt:rstood my Logical Im'ntigationl'" It can he said that this conversation initiated that school of philosophy which has come to he known as the phenomenological movement. The student in question was Johannes Dauhert" (F. G. Schmucker. lJie Phiiflolncflologic als Methode tier West'flscrkcflflllli.1 unter /lesOfldaer Bl'f"ucksic/ztigWlg der A Ujfil.\SUflg da M uflchcfl- (;iittillJ.!,1'r Ph iiI/( 1fI/i'1/( ,II 'J.!,t'flSChllli', Dissertation, Munich, I tJ56, p. I). } Unfortunately the manuscript of this work, along with other substantial Nachlass material. seems to have heen destroyed: sec E. A vc-Lallemant, nit' Nllchliisse del At i/llchell('/" PhaIlOfl/Cf/oloJ.!,ell ill del' Bayaischcll Slaals/Jihlio{hck, Wieshadell: Harrassowitz, 1975, the apparatus of which includes a useful general account of the MunichG6ttingen school. Cf. also vol. I, ch. 4 of H. Spiegelherg, The Plli'1I0ff/1'l1ologicul Movement. A Historical Introduction, 2nd cd., .Haag: NijhofL 1965 and Schmucker, op. cit. <I During these final years Reinach hegan a work on the phenomenology of religion to he called Das Absolute, and the ethical and religious ideas he developed in this period together with his conversion to Christianity exerted a considerahle influence on his contemporaries in Gottingen. Reinach's convelsion was followed by that of his wife, his sister, his brother and sister-in-law and many of his friends and pupils, including Edith Stein (cf. Stein's autohiography. Aus dCIlI Lehc1I einer jiidischl'fl Familie, heiburg: Herder, 1965, esp. pp. 172-219). His sister Pauline joined the Benedictine nuns of Mont Vierge in Wcpion, Belgium, and it is reported that before her arrival at Mont Vierge the Prioress addressed the chapter as follows: 'Tomorrow we shall have the great joy of welcoming to our community a new memher, who is, even according to the flesh, a sister of Our Lord' (reported by J. M. Oesterreicher, Walls arc Crumhlil/g, New York: Devin-Adair, 1952, p. 118). 5 Reinach's paper was puhlished in Zeitschrifi fur Philosophic lind philosophiselze Kritik, 141, 176-20tJ; cited here (with a numher of small <:Imendations) according to the 308 translation by J. N. Mohanty in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7, 1976, 16188. Husserl's acknowledgment appears in his obituary of Reinach in Kantstudien, 24, 1917, 147-49. Cf. also Husserl's remark , ' II was really Reinach who introduced me to my Logical ln vesrigations. and in an excellent way,' quoted by Oesterreicher, op. cit., p. 87. Reinach was involved in the initial reworkings of the text of the Logicallnvesrigation-f in 191 1 fo r a planned second edition of the work (K. Schuh mann, Husser!Chronik . Haag: Nij hoff. 1977, p. 155). " See Book I. Pt. Ill. Sect. I, and compare the passage from the appendix to Book 111 of the original edition appended as a footnote to Book I. Pt. I, Sect. VII by Green and Grose (p. 328) : "Tis evident. that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary. that the point or ci rcumstance of resemblance should be di stinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green lire different simple ideas, but arc more resembling than blue and -fcariet . . . 'Tis the same case with particular sounds. and tastes and smells ... * 1 (Reinach, op. cit ., p. 168 f.) Kant's interpretation of Hume was nevertheless. at least in Reinach's day, almost universally shared. One exception is th e dissertation, D. flumes Lehre vom Wissen. Eil! Beitrag l.ur Relarionstheorie;m AnschlufJ an Locke und fl ume. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1901. by Paul Linke. another philosopher who began his career as a student of jurisprudence and came to the study of philosophy and psychology as a result of the impact of Theodor Lipps. It is noteworthy how many philosophers in the Aust ri an tradition reveaJ the influence of Locke and Hume as contrasted with the Kantian and Hegelian ideas dominant in the North of Germany. See e.g. Meinong's Hume-Srudien , and G . Davie , " Edmund Husse rl and ' the as yet. in its most importan t respect. unrecognised greatness of Hume'" in G. Morice. etc., David Hume. Bicentenary Papers, Edinburgh University Press, 1977.69-76, • Reinach. op. cit. , p. 179. The issue before us can be summarised as follows: are we constrained to understand Locke's term 'consequence' here as signifying analytic (logical) consequence. or can we appeal to some rudimentary notion of ontological consequence in the sense of § 6.4 of the essay by Smith and Mulligan above? 9 This two-sided view of ideas finds echoes in the work of Herbart, a German philosopher who stands close to Hume also in many other respects. See Husse rl' s discussion of Herbart's views in § 59 of the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations. 10 A furth er. related criticism of Kant's epistemologism is presented by Reinach in his 'Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschliisse bei Kant ', Kafltstudien , 16, 1911 , 2 14 33. II Here both 'predicate' and 'term' have not only an epistemological or logico-grammatical but also an ontological significance. Compare n. 8 above. 11 The dominant role played by this concept in Reinach's thought can al most certainly be ascribed, at least in part. to his legal background. As had been continually stressed by German philosophers of law from the 18th century onward , that which is of primary importance within the orbit of the law (or within any given legal trial) belongs not to the category I'vent or action , but to the category stal~ of affuirj. Le. is a matter of (actual and possible) relations of conduct or Verhalten amongst individual legal subjects . See the preamble to my " Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought". In quiry, 14. 1978 , 42541 and the references there give n. as well as the discussion in § 1 of the essay by Smith and Mulligan above . L3 The molecular conception of the judgment survives even in Bolzano's theory of the Satz un sich as a complex of Vorstellungen un sich , and it can be discerned also in the multiple rela tions theory of judgment advanced by Russell. The account of assertive force put forward in echo of certain ideas 10 be found already in Descartes by Bren lano (for references see the discussion in § 5 of Reinach's essay), is of course distinct from that of Frege. In particular. Brentano distinguishes both positive and nega309 tive moments of force (moments of assertion and denial), where Frege, more correctly, distinguisht:s only positive force: see M. A. E. Dummett, Frege. Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973, ch. 10. In this rt:spect Reinach, despite his roots in the Brentano-Husserl tradition, is closer to Frege than to Brentano: see ~~ 13. 16 and 19 of the es~ay below. For a criticism by Reinach of Frege's theory of number see his 1914 Marburg lecture 'Ober Phanomenologie', first published in Reinach 's (;1'samlne/te Schrijtl'n. Halle: Niemeyer, 1921 .. H9-40), Eng.trans. by Dallas Willard. The Personalist, 50, 1969, 194-221. 14 Brentano did advance a t1lt'ory of Sachverha/te (called by him Urtcils;nhalte) in hi:early writings, hut he later came to conceive all talk of judgment-correlates ã necessarily eliminablc: see part III, 3 of Brentano's Wa!trhl'it und 1:'viticIlZ, Hamburg: Meiner. 19)8, 'Gegen sogenannte Urteilsinhalte, Satze an sich, Ohjektive. Sachverhalte'. IS Aspects of the theory of the Sachverhalt were anticipated in certain schola<;tic writings (see I. Habbel, Die Sachl'erhaltsprohlemalik ill der Phanom('n%gie lind hei Thomas von Aquin, Regenshurg: Hahhel. 19(0) and in the works of a number of 19th century German logicians, especally Beneke and his followers. Here it i:perhaps tht: writings of Julius Bergmann which are of greatest importance. Almost unique Iy amongst philosophers outside the Brentano tradition. Bergmann employs the word Sachverha/l as a technical term of his Il)gic. See e.g. Bergmann, Allgemeine Logik. part 1. Reinc Logik. Berlin: Mittler, 1 R79. passim. The official Brentanist account of the origin of the term is given by Reinach in ~ 8 of his essay helow. Cf. also my article. "Sachverhalt. I" in K. Grunder, cd .. His/orisches Wijrterbuch der Philosophic. Basel: Schwahe, forthcoming. 1(, As Reinach, as early as 1914 expressed it, "aile O:-terreicher vcrwechseln Satz lind Sachverhalt hestandig" (Nachlass B II 5, p. 37)). 17 On the meaning/ohject dichotomy see my "Essay in Formal Ontology" Gra;:,er Philosophischc S/udien, 6, 1978 .. ~9-62 and "Frege. Husserl and the Ontology of Reference", Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. 9, 197H, 111 25. 18 The Objektive: that there are horses. for example. contains horses among its constituents. 1'1 Cf. Dummett's criticism, op. cit., p. 153: " Since Moore and Russell drew no distinction, for what they considered to be genuine proper names, between sense and reference, the meaning of a proper name, that is, the ohject for which it stood, was for them an actual constituent of the proposition. While the proposition was intended by them not to be a full-blooded denizen of the real world, so to speak, the fact that among its constituents were actual objects belonging to that world gave it a curious hybrid status." Certainly in the case of Russell one can detect Meinong's influence in the development of his theory of the proposition. 20 See e.g. his Person and Object. London: Allen and Unwin, 1974, ch. 4. 21 Consider the discussion in the Prolegomena to the Logica/ Investigations in which Husserl considers the question of what makes the activity of scientists science. This "is certainly not the psychology of scientists' acts, nor any real context into which these acts of thought are fitted, but a certain objective or ideal interconnection which gives these acts a unitary relevance, and, in such unitary relevance, an ideal validity ... Two meanings can he attached to this objective interconnection which ideally pervades scientific thought, and thus also to science as such: it can be understood as an interco/lnection of things to which our thought experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed, or on the other hand, as an interconnection of truths in which this unity of things comes to count objectively as being what it is. These two things are given together a priori, and are mutually inseparable." (§ 62). 22 The opposition between formal and existential ontology is taken from Ingarden, Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt, Tuhingen: Niemeyer, 1964/6."1, esp. vol. I and ch. 7 of vol. 11/1. Ingarden also distinguishes a third discipline of material ontology. 310 13 P. F. Strawson, "Truth" , Procudings 0/ th~ Aristotelian Soci~ly, Supp/~rMntary VolUlm, 1950, as repro in Logico-Unguistic Papers, London: Methuen, 1971, p. 197. l 4 Consider, for example, Frege's talk of an 'eternal realm of thoughts' (discussed in detail by C. Thiel in the final chapter of his S~nse and Reference in Frege's Logic, Oonuecht: Reidel, 1968; d . also my " Frege, Husserl and the Ontology of Reference" ). lS Meinong employs a slightly different terminology according to which all Obj~ktive subsist (bestehen) , but only some are factual (tauiichlich) . For Wittgenstein's view see e.g. TractafIU 2.04: 'Oas Bcstehen und Nicbtbestehen von Sachverhalten ist die Wllklichkeit' . A valuable account of this aspect of Wittgenstein's early thought is provided by R.-A. Dietrich, SpracM und Wirlclichkeil in Wiltg~lUleins TractallU, Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1974. 16 See Chisholm, op. cit. A related position was advanced by M. Honecker in his Gegenstandslogik und D~nklogik. Vorschlag tU ~iMr Neugestallung der Logik, Berlin: Oiimmler, 1921, pp. 110ft. Honecker puts forward a conception of states of affairs as the locus of existence of the past. According to this view not objects, but states of affain, would form the subject-matter of the discipline of history. 21 Ingarden's criticism of Reinach appears in § 53 of vol . 11/ 1 of D~r Streit urn die Existent der Welt; a translation by A. Szylewicz is to appear in B. Smith, ed., For Roman Ingarden. Studies on the Borderlines 0/ Philosophy, Linguistics and Literary Theory , Amsterdam: Benjamins, forthcoming. For an account of the dispute between Reinach and lngarden and of its parallels in analytic philosophical discussions of facts see my " Essay in Formal Ontology". 11 Ingarden awarded a merely intentional existence to states of affain correlated with sentences expressing negative judgments, and with certain other types of sentences (e.g. sentences expressing empirical possibilities, and fictional sentences) ; see D~r Streit urn die Exislelll der Welt, ch. 9, and Das Iilerarische Kun.rtwerk , Halle: Niemeyer,193t , passim. 29 The fourth combinatoriaHy possible position, according to which both positive and negative states of affairs exist, but only those corresponding to true sentences, is defended by Honecker, op. cit. )0 As Reinach's essay below makes clear see especially the discussion of Wmdelband and Brenlano, a controversy had raged amongst logicians concerninB the status of negative judgments which were, for a number of reasons, taken to be more problematic than their positive counterparts. Reinach's essay can be regarded as a contribution to this debate bringing to bear ideas derived from Husserl's Logical Investigations . 3 1 The judgment is, in the terminology of Husserlian part-whole theory, a whole exhibiting both a concrete phonetic moment and a concrete psychological moment. On the . abstract character of the proposition as this is conceived within modem philosophical logic see DaUas Willard. '"The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl's Way Out" , American Philosophical Quarterly, 9, 1972,94-99. 12 On this distinction see also F. Bassenge, " Hexis und Akt. Eine phanomenologische Skizze" PhiiosophiscMr An;zeiger, 4,1930, 16368. The opposition between act and condition is an outgrowth of the Aristotelian dichotomy of b{rvãt and tvfQYEla . 33 Thus consider, for example, tbe foUowing passage from DUo Selz, Ober die Gesetze des geordneten Denkvulau/s, vol. I, Stuttgart: Spemann, 1913, a work influenced by both Husserl and Reinach: "It was Stumpf who introduced the expression 'Sachverhalt' as a technical term. Instead of this we use the expression 'Sachverhiltnis', in order to bring to expression with the word 'Verhiltnis' (relation) the peculiar nature of the Sachverhitlnis as ein sich zueinander in einer bestimmlen Weise Verhalten von be* srimmlen Gegensliinden" (p. 131 n., my italics) . Compare e.g. Tractalw, 2.03: 1m Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstiinde in bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander. 311 J 4 See my "Essay in Formal Ontology" and also "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy", in WirrgeflStcin and his Impact on Contemporary Thought . Vienna : Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Dordrecht: Reidel. 1978, 3 1 -35 , .1.5 "Essentialc Fragen". l ahrhllch fur Philosopmr I/flll plliimml('" o/agis('h(' For~'chll"g, 7. 1925, 125 304 . • 11> See especially Vhf'r di(' Grs('fzt' dt'.~ gmrdm'/('n TJenkl 'erltwfs and th e paper "Existenz als Gegcnstandshcstimmthcit " which Sclz contributed to the Lipps-Festschrift in which "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment" itse lf appea red (d. Mii"rhnu'r Philosophischt* Abl1l1.lldlun8m , 259 93). Se lz's la ter psychological writings (sec the bi bliography at the end of thi s volume) have been unfairl y neglected hy contemporary psychologists: he has made important contributions, in parti cular, to our understanding of phenomenal inte nsity. and of our experience of spatial and temporal wholes. Other philosophers innucnced by Rcinach incl uded Kurt Stave nhagen. whose book Absolute Stelillngnahmeri . Eim' ontolo8i.~chl' Umer.wclllmg uhf" d(IS We~'l'II der Reli, gioll, Erlangen: Philosophische Akademie, 1925, rests heavily on Reinach 's classification of acts and in particul ar on his theo ry of Srellllngnal!men or position-takings. Wilhelm Schapp's Die nCII l' Wi\'seflSchaft vom Recht. Eiru' phiinomenologisrhe Ulltersuchung, 2 vols .. Berlin : Verlag fUr Staalswissenschafl und Geschicht e. 1930/32 also di splays evidence of the influence of Reinach, as docs Herbert Spiegelberg, Geset;: IIlId Sittcngesetz. SlrukturanalYlische lind historische Vor.~tudie" lU ciner gest'tle~freien Elhik, Zurich und Leipzig: Niehaus. 1935. 37 See in particul ar Reinach 's Marburg leclure "Ober Phanomenologic", Eng. trans. p. 213 : ' It is sta tes of affairs which area priori , in thallhe predicat ion in them the being*B, let us say is requ ired by the nature of the A: th at is. in that the predicati on is necessarily grounded in that nature. But states of affa irs obtain indifferently of what consciousness apprehends them, and of whether they are apprehended by any consciousness at all . In and for itself. the a priori has not even the least thing to do with thinking and knowing' nor, we may add. with speaking. 38 Analytic philosophers have often put fo rward the realm of feelings as a paradigm of the subjective. As another Munich phenomenologist, Max Scheler, has shown howeve r. feelings exhibi t an objective order no less determinate th:ln the logica l order exhibited by a sct of propositions. See for example Scheler's Z lir Phiinomenologie und Theoric der Sympathiegefilhle /tnd von Liebe und Ha.u. Halle: Niemeyer, 19 13; Wesen und Formen du Sympalhie, Bonn: Cohen, 1923, and " Oer Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik", lahrbllch fur Philosophic und phiinomen%giscile Forschung. I, 19 13.405-565.2, 1916.21478. ct. also A. Kolnai, " Oer Eke!" , ibid ., 10, 1929,5 15-69. l~ See John F. Crosby. Phenomenology and the Ph ilosophy of Law: The Apriori Foutldations of Civil Law , mimeographed, University of Dallas, 1979. Crosby presents Reinach's a priori theory as a radical critique of th e conventionalist presuppositions underlying modern analytic speech act theory. On Reinach's philosophy of law in general see J.-L. Gardies, " La philosophie du droit d'Adolf Reinach". Archives de 10 PhiJosophie du Droit. 14, 1965. 17-32. Perhaps the most important difference between Rei nach's work on social acts and the work of the speech act theorists turns on the fact that Reinach , with his use of the methodology of part-whole relations, is able to produce a highly systematic and yet elegant theory of the whole range of social acts. The speech act theori sts, in overconcen trating on li nguistic differences between different types of acts, have been able to produce no complete theory of comparable elegance. 40 "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechts", }ahrbuch fur Philosophic und phiinomenologische Forschung , I , 191 3,685-847. ch. I. .(. Op. cil. , p. 696. 3 12 ' 2 Reinach draws a parallel here between the coming into existence of claims and obligations and the appearance of alterations in the natural world: both require a sufficient reason. There are however two important differences between the two: (i) The relation between cause and effect in the natural world does not exhibit the kind of necessary connection between ground and consequent into which ao immediate insight is open to us: that fire generates smoke is a state of affairs not rooted in the essence of fire . Of an event sufficient to establish a claim, however, we can recognise immediate ly that wh.enever an event of exactly the same type recurs, a corresponding claim must also once more be established . That it results in the establishment of a claim is an essential , not an accidental moment of the event in question . (ii) The type of act in which an effect in the natural world comes to givenness does not require the execution of a correlated act in which the corresponding cause is grasped. The former does not stand in need of foundation by the latter. An effect in the natural world can, at least in principle, be brought to presentation independently of its cause. It is in contrast impossible to grasp the existence of a claim or of an obligation independently of a return to the corresponding ground or reason. Only through an act in which I reestablish the existence of, say, a promise, can I establish the existence of that which follows from it. Cf. Reinach , op. tit., pp. 701 ff. 43 Cf. §§ 2-3 of "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment". 44 "Die apriorischen Grundlagen" , p. 706. 45 Loc. cit. 46 Op. ciL , p. 707. 47 Op. cit ., p. 728. 4e Op. cit., p. 710. 49 Op. cit., pp. 710f. 50 See Crosby, op. cit., p. 20 and pp. 6979. 51 The concept of a priori tendencies is considered also, from different points of view, by August Gallinger in his Das Problem der objektiven Mogiichkeit , Leipzig: Barth , 1912, esp. p. 78 on the concept of sachliche Motivation , and K. Duncker. "On Pleasure, Emotion and Striving". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, I, 1941 , 39 1430. 52 Reinach, op. cit. , p. 723. 53 Reinach's theory of representation is presented in § 7 of " Die apriorische Grundlagen", pp. 782 -800. 54 Op. elt., p. 785. 55 Some analogies between legal and linguistic representation have been considered already by H. Gomperz and K. Buhler; see the la tter 's "Ober den Begriff der sprachlichen Darstellung" . Psychologische Forschung, 3, 1921 , 282 94.